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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal 
by virtue of Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment 
in favor of defendants. Summary judgment presents only questions 
of law reviewable for correctness. Mills v. Brody, 929 P.2d 360 
(Utah App. 1996). This issue was preserved in plaintiff's 
Response to defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 114-132) 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, ETC. 
There are no determinative constitutional provisions, 
statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations whose interpretation 
is determinative or of central importance to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a final order of the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County granting defendants1 Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
II. Statement of Facts 
1. On or about September 25, 1995, plaintiff purchased a 
home from defendants located at 282 0 East Robidoux Road, Sandy, 
Utah, which included a backyard swimming pool. (R. 51) 
2. At the time of sale, there were a number of leaks in 
both the piping and the body of the swimming pool. (R. 129-130, 
135) 
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3. Plaintiff had no knowledge of the leaks when she 
purchased the property. (R. 131) 
4. Plaintiff would not have purchased the property or would 
not have paid the price she paid for the property had she been 
aware of the leaks. (R. 33) 
5. Defendants were aware of the leaks, yet failed to 
disclose their existence to plaintiff. (R. 135) 
6. The Real Estate Purchase Contract entered into by the 
parties authorized plaintiff to inspect the property. (R. 52) 
7. Plaintiff inspected the property herself and hired a 
professional inspector, AmeriSpec-Salt Lake, to inspect the 
property. (R. 52-53) 
8. AmeriSpec found the pool area and equipment covered by 
the inspection to be in working order. However, the inspection 
report was qualified: 
Our review is limited to above ground or visible items only. 
It is an operational inspection of the accessible equipment 
and components and is therefore limited in scope. If 
concerned, client is advised to have a licensed pool company 
perform an in-depth review and/or service. 
(R. 107) 
9. Plaintiff had no reason to be concerned and did not 
arrange for an in-depth review of the swimming pool. (R. 131) 
10. An in-depth review of the pool would have revealed the 
leaks. (R. 108-109) 
11. Plaintiff and her husband inspected the pool on a 
number of occasions prior to closing the purchase transaction. 
During each of those inspections, the pool was full of water and 
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there Was no visible indication that the pool leaked. (R. 127, 
131) 
112. Plaintiff commenced this action against defendants on 
July 30, 1997. In her Second Amended Complaint, plaintiff seeks 
compensatory and punitive damages based upon defendants1 
fraudulent nondisclosure/concealment of the existence of the 
swimming pool leaks. (R. 32-34) 
l|3. Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on 
July 22, 1998. (R. 110-112) Plaintiff filed her Response to 
defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment on August 4, 1998 (R. 
114-132), and defendants filed a reply memorandum on September 4, 
1998. (R. 135-137) 
ll4. For purposes of this appeal, defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment was based upon their contention that, even if 
they were aware of the leaks, they had no duty to disclose them 
to plaintiff because plaintiff could have discovered them for 
herself through the exercise reasonable care. According to 
defendants, even though plaintiff and her husband both inspected 
the pool and took the additional step of hiring a professional 
inspector to inspect the property, including the pool, 
plaintiff's failure to have a licensed pool company perform an 
in-depth review of the pool was unreasonable. (R. 56-57) 
%5. On March 18, 1999, the trial court granted defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, ruling as follows: 
Having reviewed all affidavits and memoranda that pertain to 
the Motion, and Plaintiff having waived oral argument, this 
Court has concluded that there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and that Defendants are entitled to judgment 
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as a matter of law. Specifically, this Court finds that 
Plaintiff had a duty and opportunity to conduct a thorough 
inspection of the pool and failed to do so. Under these 
circumstances, even if Defendants knew of the defects, based 
on caveat emptor, Defendants did not have a legal duty to 
disclose. 
(R. 150) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
In a vendor-vendee transaction, the vendor has a duty to 
disclose known defects which are not discoverable by reasonable 
care. Maack v. Resource Design & Const., Inc., 875 P.2d 570, 579 
(Utah App. 1994)(citing First Security Bank v. Banberry 
Development, 786 P.2d 1326, 1331 (Utah 1990)). In the case at 
bar, plaintiff exercised reasonable care by inspecting the pool 
herself and by hiring a professional inspection company to 
inspect the property, including the pool. Plaintiff's duty of 
reasonable care did not require her to take the extra step of 
hiring a licensed pool company to perform an in-depth review of 
the pool, even though in hindsight such a review would have 
revealed the existence of the leaks. Accordingly, defendants 
owed plaintiff a duty to disclose the existence of the leaks. 
Additionally, the trial court imposed upon plaintiff a duty 
to "conduct a thorough inspection of the pool." This heightened 
duty is in irreconcilable with the duty of "reasonable care" 
recognized in Banberry and Maack. Accordingly, the trial court's 
Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment is contrary to law and 
should be reversed. 
4 
ARGUMENTS 
The trial court erred in granting defendants1 Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
Summary judgment presents only questions of law reviewable 
for correctness. Mills v. Brody, 929 P.2d 360 (Utah App. 1996). 
When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the facts, the 
evidence, and every reasonable inference arising therefrom, must 
be considered in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. 
Maack v. Resource Design & Const., Inc., 875 P.2d 570, 574 (Utah 
App. 1994). 
Af. Plaintiff exercised "reasonable care" in her inspection 
of the property. 
In a vendor-vendee transaction, such as the one at issue in 
the present case, a duty to disclose known defects exists where 
the defects are not discoverable by the exercise of reasonable 
care. Maack, 875 P.2d at 579. In the case at bar, for purposes 
of their Motion for Summary Judgment, it is undisputed that 
defendants knew their swimming pool had a pervasive problem with 
leaks when they sold it to plaintiff. Accordingly, unless 
plaintiff failed to exercise of reasonable care in her inspection 
of the property, defendants owed plaintiff a duty to disclose the 
existence of the leaks. 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that she exercised reasonable 
care in her inspection of the property. Plaintiff and her 
husband inspected the pool on a number of occasions prior to 
purchasing the property. On each occasion, the pool was full of 
water and there was no visible indication that the pool leaked. 
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Nevertheless, plaintiff hired a professional inspection company, 
AmeriSpec-Salt Lake, to inspect the property. AmeriSpec found 
the pool area and equipment covered by the inspection to be in 
working order. However, the inspection report stated that: 
Our review is limited to above ground or visible items only. 
It is an operational inspection of the accessible equipment 
and components and is therefore limited in scope. If 
concerned, client is advised to have a licensed pool company 
perform an in-depth review and/or service. 
(R. 107)(emphasis added). Plaintiff had no reason to be 
concerned and did not arrange for an in-depth review of the 
swimming pool. Plaintiff respectfully submits that it was 
reasonable for her not to do so. 
If AmeriSpec's report had unequivocally advised plaintiff to 
have an in-depth review of the pool by a licensed pool company, 
it may have been unreasonable for plaintiff to have failed to 
obtain such a review. That is not the case. To the contrary, 
the report advised plaintiff to have such a review only if she 
was "concerned." Plaintiff, however, had no reason to be 
concerned. The leaks were not visible and in fact were not 
discovered by the professional inspector hired by plaintiff. 
Defendants, on the other hand, were well aware of the leaks and 
could easily have disclosed their existence.1 
xGiven the fact that the pool was always full of water on 
the several occasions on which plaintiff and her husband 
inspected the pool prior to closing and that it was leaking like 
a sieve immediately thereafter, it is reasonable to infer that 
defendants actively concealed the leaks by keeping the pool full 
of water so that the leaks would not become apparent until after 
defendants were long gone to their new residence in Arizona. 
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Defendants rely on this Court's decision in Maack v. 
Resource Design & Const.,, Inc., 875 P.2d 570 (Utah App. 1994). 
There, the plaintiff/home buyers sued the defendant/home seller 
alleging that the defendant failed to disclose the known 
defective condition of the home's stucco prior to the time of 
sale. This Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant in large part due to the fact 
that it was undisputed that, for aesthetic reasons, the defendant 
had intentionally chosen a cement-based stucco instead of 
synthetic acrylic stucco, even though the cement-based stucco had 
a potential for cracking and might not be appropriate in freezing 
climates. It was also undisputed that the plaintiffs "did not 
have the home inspected before they agreed to purchase it ..." 
875 P.2d at 573. After the stucco subsequently began cracking, 
the plaintiffs filed suit alleging causes of action for 
fraudulent concealment and fraudulent nondisclosure. 
With respect to the fraudulent concealment claim, the Maack 
court held that 
|t]he facts alleged by the Maacks fail to support a claim 
for fraudulent concealment, as no evidence is offered to 
prove that [the seller] intentionally or actively concealed 
any defect in the home.^ Indeed, [the seller] preferred for 
aesthetic reasons the substituted stucco, even though it had 
3. greater chance of cracking. 
875 P.2d at 578. 
Thus, even though the stucco at issue in Maack could 
technically have been considered defective because it later 
Citations omitted. 
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turned out that it had a cracking problem, there was no evidence 
that the seller considered it to be defective at the time of sale 
because he specifically chose it for aesthetic reasons in spite 
of the fact that it had the potential for cracking. In the case 
at bar, however, defendants obviously did not intentionally 
choose a swimming pool with leaks. And they certainly cannot 
claim that they did not consider the leaks to be defects because 
they were aesthetically pleasing. 
With respect to the Maackfs fraudulent nondisclosure claim, 
the court held as follows: 
Although this issue presents a close call, we hold that 
under these circumstances [the seller] had no legal duty to 
disclose his doubts, if any, about the integrity of the 
stucco. 
875 P.2d at 579. 
Thus, the buyers1 failure to obtain an inspection of the 
property, coupled with the fact that the seller did not consider 
the stucco to be defective in the first place, but, rather, 
aesthetically pleasing, presented a "close call" for this Court 
in Maack. The case at bar does not present a close call. In 
contrast to the Maacks, plaintiff did have the property inspected 
prior to closing. More importantly, defendants cannotsay that 
even though they were aware of the leaks they did not consider 
them to be defects, as was the case in Maack. To the contrary, 
the pool was obviously defective and its condition should have 
been disclosed. 
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3. The trial court1 imposition of a heightened duty of 
care was erroneous. 
Illn granting defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
trial court ruled that "Plaintiff had a duty ... to conduct a 
thorough inspection of the pool and failed to do so." Plaintiff 
respectfully submits that the trial court's imposition of a 
heightened duty to "conduct a thorough inspection" is in conflict 
with the duty of "reasonable care" set forth in Banberry, 78 6 
P.2d at 1331, and Maack, 875 P.2d at 579. For this additional 
reason, the trial court's Order Granting Motion for Summary 
Judgment is contrary to law and should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, plaintiff respectfully requests that 
the trial court's Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment be 
reversed and that this case be remanded to the trial court for a 
trial on the merits. 
EfATED this / A day of October, 1999. 
^ r, 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
Undersigned certifies that two copies of the foregoing were 
mailed this /y^day of October, 1999, via first class U.S. Mail, 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
George E. Harris, Jr. 
Gateway Tower East, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841,3 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, DIVISION II 
* * * * * * * 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 970006149 
Judge Dennis M. Fuchs 
DORANN MITCHELL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JESSE CHRISTENSEN and BETTY 
CHRISTENSEN, 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * * 
Before this Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment (the "Motion"), filed July 22, 1998. Having reviewed 
all affidavits and memoranda that pertain to the Motion, and 
Plaintiff having waived oral argument, this Court has concluded 
that there are no genuine issues of material fact and 
Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Specifically, this Court finds that Plaintiff had a duty and 
opportunity to conduct a thorough inspection of the pool and 
failed to do so. Under these circumstances, even if Defendants 
knew of the defects, based on caveat emptor, Defendants did not 
have a legal duty to disclose. 
Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 
DATED this /<F day of March, 1999. 
